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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WALTER W. SPRAGUE and UNITED 
STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Respondents, 
v. 
BOYLES BROS. DRILLING COM-
P ANY, a corporation, 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8351 
The judgment appealed from was entered at the con-
clusion of a non-jury trial of an action involving charges 
and countercharges of breaches of a subcontract providing 
for the production of rock to be used by respondent Sprague 
in the performance of his contract with the United States 
wherein he undertook to construct a levee on the banks of 
the Snake River in the vicinity of Rigby, Idaho (R. 1-18, 
R. 26-30). 
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The subcontract provided for the production of the 
rock by the joint efforts of appellant and Sprague. Ap-
pellant undertook to break into size 50 to 350 pounds a 
minimum of 12,200 tons of native rock located in the Olsen 
Quarry. The rock was to be broken in time to enable 
Sprague to deliver it to the levee within the time limit of 
his contract with the Government. Sprague agreed to 
furnish sufficient compressed air to operate appellant's 
drills efficiently, and to remove the rock from the quarry 
as it was broken into the sizes specified "so as not to cause 
delay." Sprague promised to pay appellant for breaking 
the rock at the rate of forty-eight cents per ton, and to 
make a progress payment of seventy-five percent of the 
contract price on or before April 20, 1950. In the event 
more than 12,200 tons of rock were required for the levee 
which Sprague had agreed to construct, appellant promised 
to break the excess provided it was requested to do so be-
fore it had broken the required minimum of rock. If the 
breaking of the 12,200 tons of rock into the sizes specified 
resulted in the production of other usable or salable rock, 
Sprague agreed to pay for it at the rate of forty-eight 
cents per ton at the time of sale or use. The subcontract 
further provided that if appellant should be unable to furn-
ish adequate labor, equipment or material to complete the 
subcontract within the time specified, Sprague could in 
the name of appellant "put on such additional force and 
outfit as may be required" at the expense of appellant (R. 
8-10). 
The complaint alleges in the first count that defendant 
only partially performed its obligations under the sub-
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contract; that Sprague- paid $8,087.08 for labor, material, 
supplies, equipment, rental and service-s to complete the 
performance of appellant's obligations under the subcon-
tract; that he paid appellant $4,392.00 and that there was 
a balance of $5,085.16 due him. He claimed that he "was 
entitled to receive" from the defendant because of its fail-
ure to complete its obligations under the subcontract "the 
sum of $2,500.00 for additional loading and hauling costs." 
Sprague alleged also that he was penalized $1,050.00 for 
his failure to perform his prime- contract within the time 
therein specified and attributed his default under the prime 
contract to defendant's alleged failure to perform the sub-
contract (R. 1-3). 
A second cause of action in the complaint asserted that 
the plaintiff United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company 
had furnished Sprague the payment and performance bonds 
required by his prime contract. It reiterated the charges 
of failure on the part of appellant to complete the subcon-
tract, the expenditures made to complete appellant's obli-
gations, the penalty imposed upon Sprague, and the "addi-
tional loading and hauling costs." Contrary to the first 
count, the second count stated that the progress payment 
made to appellant, the payment of the additional loading 
and hauling costs, the expenditures to complete the subcon-
tract and the payment of the penalty against Sprague were 
all made by the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com-
pany. It claimed the right to be subrogated to all claims 
which Sprague had against defendant under the subcon-
tract (R. 3-7). 
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The answer and counterclaim of defendant conceded 
that defendant had not broken the minimum quantity of 
rock specified in the subcontract. As justification for its 
failure in that regard, it asserted that Sprague failed and 
neglected to furnish compressed air for the operation of 
its drills, failed and neglected to move the rock from the 
quarry as it was broken into the sizes specified, and also 
failed and neglected to make the progress payment within 
the time required by the subcontract, or at all. It also 
asserted that it learned that Sprague was insolvent and 
financially unable to perform his part of the subcontract. 
The answer and counterclaim further alleged that fol-
lowing the foregoing defaults on the part of Sprague, de-
fendant removed its equipment and employees from the 
quarry, that thereupon the plaintiff United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Company prevailed upon the defendant to re-
sume the performance of the subcontract, and assured the 
defendant that if it would do so, United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Company would make the progress payment 
which Sprague had failed to make and would comply with 
all of the provisions of the subcontract to be performed 
by Sprague ; that in reliance upon such assurance, the de-
fendant returned its equipment and employees to the quarry, 
and resumed performance of the subcontract. Defendant 
admitted that the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com-
pany made the progress payment as promised, but alleged 
that it failed to furnish compressed air for the operation 
of defendant's drills, except for a short period of time. 
Defendant also alleged that because of the failure of the 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company to furnish 
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the compressed air as promised, defendant again stopped 
performance under the subcontract and again removed its 
men and equipment from the quarry (R. 11-16). 
Although the trial court made and entered what are 
designated as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
there was no determination made of the controlling issues 
above set forth (R. 26-29). That court did conclude that 
Sprague "performed his part of the contract," and that 
appellant "breached the contract." It also concluded that 
Sprague suffered damages "for increased cost of loading 
and hauling rock" and in certain stated sums for rock pur-
chased, and because of expenditures made "in performing 
those things required by the subcontract to be performed" 
by the defendant (R. 26-30). Upon these conclusions the 
court entered judgment in favor of both plaintiffs in the 
amount of $12,187.27, plus interest and costs, and dismissed 
the defendant's counterclaim (R. 30). 
Defendant commenced operations in the quarry a few 
days before Christmas of 1949 (R. 287). 
The primary breaking of the rock was done by the use 
of explosives (R. 85). A tunnel referred to in the record 
as a coyote hole was driven into the wall of the quarry a 
distance of seventy-five feet (R. 288). At the end of the 
tunnel two wings were drilled outward thirty feet on each 
side of the tunnel, and an enlarged pocket was made at 
the tip of each wing (R. 288). 
The tunnel work was done by the use of a piece of 
equipment designated as a leyner (R. 288). The drills are 
mounted on the leyner and operated by compressed air (R. 
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288). Sprague furnished a Schramm 315 air compressor 
which was brought to the quarry on the evening of Decem-
ber 20, for defendant's use in running the leyner (R. 288). 
The compressor was in poor mechanical condition, and 
several hours were spent by the employees of both Sprague 
and defendant in getting the compressor started (R. 289). 
After finally getting it in operation, constant difficulty 
was encountered getting it started at the beginning of the 
day ( R. 290-4) . It failed completely on several occasions 
and had to be taken from the quarry for repairs ( R. 334) . 
One of defendant's employees stated that defendant lost 
fourteen shifts of work because of the mechanical failures 
of the compressor (R. 213-14) (Ex. 40) (R. 337). As a 
result of these delays, the tunnel was not completed until 
February 3 (R. 86). On that day a large amount of dyna-
mite was placed in the enlarged pockets on the wings of 
the tunnel and exploded (R. 86). Several thousand tons of 
rock were broken by the blast and fell to the floor of the 
quarry (Ex. 25) (R. 293). A large amount of the broken 
rock was over-size and required secondary breaking to 
make it conform to the subcontract (R. 316). The secondary 
breaking was done by either drilling a hole in which dyna-
mite was inserted, or by plastering the dynamite on the 
outside of the rock (R. 359). Defendant promptly pro-
ceeded with the secondary breaking, and by the latter part 
of February, all visible rock in the quarry was broken into 
the sizes specified in the subcontract (R. 327). 
Sprague made no attempt to remove any of the contract 
size rock from the quarry, and defendant's employees were 
withdrawn from the quarry (R. 340, R. 116). In the latter 
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part of April, defendant was informed that Sprague would 
immediately commence removal of the rock. An em-
ployee was dispatched to the quarry to resume work as soon 
as the broken rock was removed (R. 342). This employee 
remained at the quarry for a week or ten days, and since 
Sprague had made no atte~pt to remove any rock, the 
employee left the quarry and removed defendant's equip-
ment (R. 343). 
In July, plaintiff, United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company, learned that Sprague had incurred obligations 
in excess of $30,000.00 which he was unable to pay (R. 
207-14). Among these bills owing was the progress pay-
ment due the defendant (R. 242-43). The surety made the 
progress payment to defendant, and prevailed upon it to 
resume the work of breaking the rock (R. 97) (Ex. 28). 
Sprague or his surety moved a few tons of the contract size 
rock from the quarry in May and on August 1st resumed 
hauling of the rock to the levee. On August 3rd defendant 
returned its men and equipment to the quarry and resumed 
operations (R. 363). Defendant was supplied with a small 
compressor to operate its drills for secondary breaking (R. 
364). Soon after defendant resumed operations in the 
quarry it became necessary to break additional native 
rock (R. 365). A large compressor was required to drill 
the deeper holes needed for the primary breaking (R. 367-
7). This was furnished on August 16 (R. 365). On Sep-
tember 21, the bearings in the large compressor burned out, 
and it was removed from the quarry (R. 366) . It evidently 
was beyond repair, because it was never returned to the 
quarry (R. 411). The compressor which remained in the 
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quarry was a small one and would operate only one drill 
for secondary breaking (R. 366). The plaintiffs ende·avored 
to obtain another compressor, but were unable to do so (R. 
412-3). Defendant's equipment and employees remained at 
the quarry from September 21 until October 5, during which 
time they were unable to do any work in the quarry because 
of the lack of a compressor ( R. 372) . On October 5, de-
fendant withdrew its employees and equipment from the 
quarry, and did not thereafter resume performance of the 
subcontract ( R. 387-8) . 
The trial court found that the defendant broke into 
sizes specified in the subcontract a total of 9, 799 tons (R. 
27). Sprague admitted that he sold 1,000 tons of the rock 
broken by defendant, and that this rock was not used on 
the levee (R. 251). This was over-size rock (R. 251). 
Sprague's contract with the Government as amended subse-
quent to the subcontract required 15,400 tons of rock of 
the sizes specified in the subcontract (R. 27). 
After defendant left the quarry on October 5, plaintiffs 
proceeded to produce the additional rock required to com-
plete the prime contract (R. 119). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS ER-
RONEOUS BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO 
THE EVIDENCE WHICH ESTABLISHES 
THAT THE ONLY BREACH OF THE SUB-
CONTRACT WAS THAT COMMITTED BY 
PLAlNTIFFS. 
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POINT II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT 
BREAK THE ROCK INTO CONTRACT SIZE 
IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
PROVE THAT THE COST TO PLAINTIFF OF 
:PE,ODUCING THE ADDITIONAL ROCK EX-
CEEDED WHAT HE AGREED TO PAY DE ... 
FEND ANT. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 
PLAINTIFFS ANY AMOUNT ON ACCOUNT 
OF LOADING OR HAULING COSTS. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAIN-
TIFFS $850.00 ON ACCOUNT OF SPRAGUE'S 
FAILURE TO COMPLETE HIS PRIME CON-
TRACT. 
POINT VI 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARAN-
TY COMPANY IS LIABLE TO DEFENDANT 
FOR FAILURE TO FURNISH COMPRESSED 
AIR BECAUSE IT ASSUMED THE OBLIGA-
TIONS OF SPRAGUE UNDER THE SUBCON-
TRACT. 
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POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAIN-
TIFFS $292.80 FOR ROCK PURCHASED. 
POINT VIII 
THEJUDGMENTISERRONEOUSBECAUSE 
IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT. 
POINT IX 
THE JUDGMENT MUST BE VACATED BE-
CAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE COURT 
TO FIND ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES 
RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS. 
POINT X 
THE PRESENT ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ABATED BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF 
ANOTHER SUIT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS ER-
RONEOUS BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO 
THE EVIDENCE WHICH ESTABLISHES 
THAT THE ONLY BREACH OF THE SUB-
CONTRACT WAS THAT COMMITTED BY 
PLAINTIFFS. 
The failure of plaintiffs to furnish defendant with 
sufficient compressed air to operate its drills efficiently, 
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and to remove the rock from the quarry as it was broken 
into contract size is established by evidence which is with-
out any conflict whatever. Their failure to make the 
progress payment as provided by the subcontract until 
more than three months after it was due is admitted by 
them. It is likewise conceded by plaintiffs that at least as 
of July, Sprague was financially unable to proceed unde,r 
either his subcontract or his prime contract, and that the 
surety upon his payment and performance bonds was com-
pelled to pay out in excess of $30,000.00 on account of 
labor and material furnished him. We shall elaborate on 
these breaches of the subcontract in the order above indi-
cated. 
It will be noted that the subcontract is dated more 
than a month after defendant commenced work in the 
quarry. Whether it was executed prior to its date does 
not appear in the evidence, but it is clear that its terms 
were agreed upon before the defendant started operations. 
Sprague recognized his obligation to furnish sufficient 
compressed air to operate defendant's drills efficiently by 
procuring a Schramm 315 compressor, which he delivered 
to the quarry on December 20. His breach of this obliga-
tion occurred immediately upon delivery of the compressor 
to the quarry, and continued throughout the time defen-
dant was engaged in drilling the coyote hole. It required 
the combined efforts of two of Sprague's employees and at 
least one of defendant's employees for a period of several 
hours to get the compressor started initially. Practically every 
morning thereafter defendant's employees encountered more 
or less difficulty starting it (R. 336). Although adequate 
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in size, it was in very poor mechanical condition (R. 333). 
The release valves would not disengage, which caused the 
motor to stop. Two days after it arrived at the quarry, it 
was sent to Idaho Falls for repairs (R. 334). About two 
weeks later, the clutch went out and it was again sent to 
ldaho Falls after a mechanic sent to the quarry was unable 
to repair it (R. 330). During the period the compressor 
was used to operate the leyner, the defendant was required 
to pay its employees for fourteen shifts of standby time 
due to the failure of the compressor (See plaintiff's Exhibit 
40). A shift consisted of two workmen and a day and a 
night shift were employed (R. 335). 
At no time did Sprague or any of his employees oper-
ate or assist in the operation of the compressor except to 
get it started initially (R. 334). Defendant's employees 
alone operated the compressor. They were skilled in the 
operation of various types of air compressors. 
Following the completion of the coyote hole, the Schramm 
compressor was removed from the quarry (R. 338). 
For defendants use in the secondary breaking of rock, 
Sprague furnished a 105 Leroi compressor which would 
produce only seventy or eighty pounds of compressed air 
(R. 338). It furnished barely enough compressed air to 
operate one drill. Nevertheless, before the end of February, 
defendant broke into the sizes specified in the contract all 
of the rock broken by the blast in the coyote hole and which 
was exposed in the quarry. 
Sprague failed to remove the contract size rock from 
the qu,arry and about May 1 defendant ceased operations 
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in the quarry. In the latter part of July Sprague's surety 
made the April payment due under the subcontract and 
prevailed upon defendant to resume breaking rock. 
On August 3, defendant sent its men and equipment 
back to the quarry to resume breaking rock. On August 
1, plaintiffs started to haul away the rock that had been 
broken to contract size. Some of the oversize rock broken 
by the ·primary explosion was in the quarry, and defendant 
proceeded with the work of breaking it into contract size. 
It sent three jack hammers to the quarry to do the secon-
dary breaking. However, only the Leroi 115 compressor 
was furnished to operate these jack hammers. It soon be-
came necessary to do further primary breaking of rock, 
and mucll more compressed air was required than could 
be supplied by the Leroi compressor. In response to defen-
dant's demand, the plaintiffs rented from Bergraph Broth-
ers a 315 compressor which was delivered to the quarry 
about August 19. A compressor of this size was required to 
operate the drills to make the holes needed for the primary 
breaking of the rock. After the arrival of the Bergraph 
compressor, the breaking of the rock by the defendant pro-
ceeded at a very rapid pace. Defendant employed five men 
on two shifts. Three drills were kept in operation and dur-
ing the next four or five weeks several thousand tons of 
rock were broken by the defendant into the sizes specified 
in the subcontract. This was hauled away by the plaintiffs 
without unreasonable delay. This stepped-up activity in 
the quarry was abruptly halted on the evening of September 
21, when the bearings in the Bergraph compressor burned 
out (R. 365-6). Plaintiffs' superintendent was immediately 
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notified of the failure of the Bergraph compressor and he 
. tried to locate another one because "I was aware of the fact 
I • • • 
, that we must have another compressor. Now whether I started 
to locate one before he told me or after, but as soon as it 
brok~ down, as soon as I got to town, I started to locate 
· anothe~ compressor" (R. 414). He returned the compressor 
to Bergraphs and requested that "they repair it immed-
iately ~R. 411). He kept pressing Bergraph Brothers "try-
ing to expedite the repairing of it" (R. 412). He also con-
tacted "every equipment house and contractor, or anybody 
who I thought might have a compressor or know of a com-
pressor throughout the state and two surrounding states, 
trying to locate a compressor, and I sat on the phone for 
hours and hours and hours calling" (R. 412). During this 
period from September 21, until October 5, defendant's 
equipment and employees remained idle in the quarry. De-
fendant was required to pay one of its employees for full 
time during this period, while he sat in the quarry waiting 
for compressed air to operate the defendant's equipment. 
Several other employees were paid show-up time during 
this period and held themselves in readiness to return to 
the quarry. Defendant removed its equipment and employ-
ees from the quarry on October 5 (R. 372). 
The failure of Sprague to remove the rock from the 
quarry concurrently with its being broken into contract 
size occurred prior to the time his surety induced the de-
fendant to resume performance of the subcontract. 
All of the rock broken by the initial blast and which 
was exposed in the quarry was rebroken to contract size 
by the defendant before the end of February. The precise 
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amount of rock thus broken may not be definitely estab-
lished but the records maintained by the plaintiffs disclose 
that more than 1,000 tons of rock were broken into contract 
size in the quarry prior to February 23 (R. 360-1). None 
of this rock was removed from the quarry for a period of 
more than two months. About the last week in April, 
Sprague informed defendant that he would start removing 
this contract size rock from the quarry (R. 342). Defen-
dant promptly sent one of its employees to the quarry to 
resume secondary breaking of rock. He remained at the 
quarry with his equipment waiting for Sprague to remove 
the rock. Sprague failed to remove any of the rock, and 
about May 1, defendant withdrew its employee and equip-
ment from the quarry (R. 343). 
Sprague kept a record of the date each ton of contract 
size rock was removed from the quarry. This record con-
sisted of weigh tickets issued by an employee of the United 
States, who weighed the rock on scales just outside the 
quarry (Ex. 32). One copy of the weigh ticket was given 
to Sprague and one copy to the trucker who hauled the 
rock. The weigh tickets issued to Sprague and the copies 
issued to the truckers were introduced in evidence by the 
plaintiffs .. Mrs. Sprague who kept the books for her hus-
band summarized these weigh tickets in Exhibit 49. Ac-
cording to these records no contract size rock whatever 
was moved from the quarry until May 7, when a little more 
than 24 tons were hauled away. On May 15, 114 tons, on 
May 16, 194 tons, and on May 17, 248 tons of contract size 
rock were hauled away from the quarry. No contract size 
rock was removed from the quarry after May 17, until 
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August 1. On Aug~st 1,_ 198 tons and on August 2, 222 
tons were removed (Ex. 3Z) . . 
·The foregoing breaches of Sprague's covenants fn the 
subcontract have several legal consequences, all of which 
are exactly opposite to the judgment appealed from. The 
first is that the failure of Sprague or his surety to furnish 
the defendant with sufficient compressed air to operate its 
drills ~fficiently after it had been induced by the surety to 
resume production of rock justified the defendant in stop-
ping performance of its part of the subcontract. The legal 
effect of Sprague's failure to- furnish compressed air while 
defendant was drillin"g the coyote holes will be considered 
later.· 
As has been pointed out, the 315 compressor broke 
down ·completely on the -evening of September 21. ·This left 
in the quarry only the 105 Leroi compressor, which was 
barely sufficient to operate one drill for secondary break-
ing. Defendant then had three drills in the quarry with 
five employees to operate them. The 315 compressor was 
required to do the primary breaking of the rock, and inas-
much as all of the rock broken by the explosion in the 
coyote holes had been rebroken into contract size and re-
moved from the quarry, the failure of the 315 compressor 
completely halted the further production of rock. Appar-
ently, the failure of the 315 compressor was beyond repair, 
as it was taken from the quarry to Idaho Falls and never 
returned. Defendant's equipment remained idle in the 
quarry until October 5, as did two of its employees. Its 
other employees remained in readiness to resume work in 
the quarry. No compressed air of any kind was furnished 
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by either Sprague or his surety during this period of more 
than two weeks, except what could be produced by the 
small Leroi compressor which was useless to the defen-
dant because it could not be used for primary breaking. 
Plaintiffs fully realized that their failure to furnish com-
pressed air at this time prevented the defendant from pro-
ducing the rock, as they made frantic efforts to procure 
another compressor. They were not, however, able to do so 
and defendant was fully justified in stopping performance 
before the additional rock had been produced. Such justifi-
cation is set forth in Restatement of the Law of Contracts 
(Sec. 274). 
"(1) In promises for an agreed exchange any 
material failure of performance by one party not 
justified by the conduct of the other discharges the 
latters duty to give the agreed exchange even though 
his promise is not in terms conditional. An imma-
terial failure does not operate as such a discharge." 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision recognized 
the failure of Sprague and his surety to comply with the 
covenant to furnish defendant sufficient compressed air 
to operate its drills efficiently, but stated that it was not 
sufficient in time or effect to constiute a rescission or can-
cellation of the contract. The trial judge was not only 
confused with respect to the testimony of the wit-
nesses on the subject of compressed air furnished to the 
defendant, but he misconceived the law applicable to a 
breach of contract. The defendant made no claim either 
in its pleadings or at anytime in the course of trial that it 
had the right to rescind the contract or have it cancelled. 
On the contrary, the defendant asserts, and has at all times 
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asserted, that the breach of the covenant by Sprague to 
furnish compressed air legally justified it in failing to pro-
duce the amount of rock required by the contract, and gave 
it the right to recover the damage sustained by it as a 
result of the breach. The right to rescind a contract rests 
upon entirely different considerations from those which 
give a right of action for damages or which justify a party 
in refusing to perform its part of a contract. The distinc-
tions are pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Anvil Mining Company v. Humble, 153 U. S. 540. 
In that case the plaintiffs and defendant entered into a 
contract by the terms of which the plaintiffs undertook to 
mine a certain quantity of ore during a specified period 
from the defendant's mine. The defendant undertook to 
lift the ore after it had been placed on the skips by the 
plaintiff at the first level of the mine. There was· testimony 
that the defendant interfered with the plaintiffs' perform-
ance of the contract. The court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
"If the jury find from the evidence that the 
plaintiffs were in good faith endeavoring to carry 
out and perform said contract according to its terms, 
and the defendant wantonly or carelessly and negli-
gently interfered with and hindered and prevented 
the plaintiffs in such performance to such an extent 
as to render the performance of it difficult, and 
greatly decrease the profits which the plaintiffs 
would otherwise have made, then and in such case 
such interference was unauthorized and illegal and 
would have justified the plaintiffs in abandoning 
the contract, and would have entitled them to recover 
such damages as they actually suffered by being 
hindered and prevented from performing such con-
tract." 
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The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs 
and the defendant contended that the instruction permitted 
the plaintiffs to recover damages and at the same time 
rescind the contract. The Supreme Court of the United 
States disposed of this point as follows: 
"It is insisted, and authorities are cited in sup-
port thereof, that a party cannot rescind a contract 
and at the same time recover damages for his non-
performance. But no such proposition as that is 
contained in that instruction. It only lays down the 
rule, and it lays that down correctly, which obtains 
when there is a breach of contract. Whenever one 
party thereto is guilty of such a breach as is here 
attributed to the defendant, the other yarty is at 
liberty to treat the contract as broken and desist from 
any further effort on his part to perform; in other 
words, he may abandon it, and recover as damages 
the profits which he would have received through 
full performance. Such an abandonment is not tech-
nically a rescission of the contract, but is merely an 
acceptance of the situation which the wrong-doing 
of the other party has brought about. Generally 
speaking, it is true that when a contract is not per-
formed the party who is guilty of the first breach 
is the one upon whom rests all the liability for the 
nonperformance. A party who engages to do work 
has a right to proceed free from any let or hindrance 
of the other party, and if such other party interferes, 
hinders, and prevents the doing of the work to such 
an extent as to render its performance difficult and 
largely diminish the profits, the first may treat the 
contract as broken, and is not bound to proceed 
under the added burdens and increased expense. It 
may stop and sue for the damages which it has sus-
tained by reason of the non-performance which the 
other has caused." 
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The same proposition is stated in 17 C. J. S. at pages 
979-980, as follows : 
"In some cases a breach of the contract of one 
party may be of such character as to permit the 
other party to abandon it and sue at once for entire 
damages. Such an abandonment is to be distin-
guished from a technical rescission discussed in 
paragraph 421, supra, in that the contract may still 
be resorted to by the party for the purpose of fixing 
the damages which he has sustained by reason of 
the breach occasioning the abandonment of perform-
ance. Notice to the party in default of the intention 
to claim damages is unnecessary." 
It necessarily follows that since the defendant was 
legally justified in stopping operations on October 5, it 
did not breach the contract and plaintiffs can recover noth-
ing, on account of defendant's failure to break the required 
additional rock. We quote from Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts under Sec. 312, as follows: 
"a. The expression 'breach of contract' is con-
fined to wrongful conduct. The promisor does not 
necessarily commit a breach of contract if he fails to 
perform his promise. Thus, under the definition in 
the Section, non-performance of a contract, if jus-
tified, is not a breach. Justification may be due to 
the fact that the duty arising when the contract was 
formed has been discharged, or if that is not the 
case, to the fact that a duty of immediate perform-
ance has not arisen because some condition prece-
dent has not occurred." 
In William B. Hughes Produce Co. v. Pulley, 47 Utah 
544, 155 Pac. 337, the plaintiff Hughes Co., contracted to 
purchase 600 pounds of potatoe·s from defendant and agreed 
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to furnish the sacks for sacking them. It was undisputed 
that plaintiff failed to furnish the sacks and that defen-
dant abandoned the contract by selling the potatoes to a 
third person. The trial court entered judgment for plain-
tiff, apparently on the theory that failure to supply the 
sacks for the potatoes was not a sufficiently substantial 
breach to justify defendant's abandonment of the contract. 
On appeal, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and 
the action dismissed. Our Supreme Court said: 
"Now, it seems to us that while the defendant 
had obligated himself to deliver the potatoes as stip-
ulated in the agreement, the plaintiff had bound 
himself to furnish the necessary sacks in which the 
potatoes were to be sacked before delivery. If it be 
held that plaintiff was not required to furnish the 
sacks, then something he agreed to do must be elim-
inated from the agreement. * * * It might be 
that a certain stipulation by the party agreeing to 
perform it offers no excuse for the other party to 
refuse to comply with all of the terms of his agree-
ment. Courts should, however, be very careful not 
to excuse parties from their obligations by substitut-
ing their own judgment for that of the parties with 
respect to what constitutes a material stipulation in 
a contract. * * * This court is firmly com-
mitted to the doctrine that courts may 'enforce, but 
not create, liabilities' * * * What right have 
we to excuse the plaintiff from furnishing the sacks 
while we enforce the obligation of the defendant to 
deliver the potatoes. * * * Under the terms of 
the contract, the defendant was * * * required 
to sack the potatoes and to deliver them sacked 
within 30 days from the making of the contract. 
He, we think, was not required to comply with these 
conditions unless he was furnished the sacks in 
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which to place the potatoes. Had the plaintiff com-
plied with the terms of his agreement in that regard, 
no dilema nor controversy would perhaps have aris-
en. The plaintiff, and not the defendant, therefore, 
is responsible for defendant's failure to deliver the 
potatoes at the time and place specified in the agree-
ment. That being so, we cannot see how the plain-
tiff can prevail in an action for a breach of a con-
tract, for which breach he alone is responsible." 
Other cases which support defendant's contention that 
it did not breach the contract by stopping work before all 
of the rock was broken, and that the plaintiffs cannot re-
cover anything on account of defendant's failure to complete 
the work are: Bennett v. Shaunghnessy, et al., 6 Utah 273, 
22 Pac. 156; Pool v. Motter, 55 Utah 288, 185 Pac. 714; 
Pack v. Wines, 44 Utah 427, 141 Pac. 105; Lawley v. Wade, 
39 Utah 537, 118 Pac. 484; Orphere, etc. v. Clayton, 44 
Utah 453, 140 Pac. 653; McConnell v. Corona etc., 149 Cal. 
60, 85 Pac. 929; Boomer v. Muir, (Cal. App.), 24 P. 2d 570; 
Bradley v. Nevada, etc., 42 Nev. 411, 178 Pac. 906; Davis 
v. Brown etc., 21 S. D. 173, 110 N. W. 113. 
The foregoing authority establishes not only that the 
defendant was justified in terminating the subcontract be-
cause of the plaintiffs' breach of the covenant to furnish 
defendant sufficient compressed air to operate its drills 
efficiently, but also that the defendant is entitled to recover 
under its counterclaim the damage sustained by it as a 
result of such breach. We have already pointed out the 
number of shifts which defendant was required to pay for 
when its men were idle because there was no compressed 
air to operate defendant's equipment. A total of 14 shifts 
was lost while the coyote hole was being drilled. Following 
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the breakdown of the compressor on September 21, one of 
defendant's employees remained at the quarry throughout 
a period of two weeks. Several employees were paid show-
up time during this two-week period. All of these employ-
ees except Lowery were paid at an hourly rate. The evidence 
of the amount paid by defendant for time lost due to air 
compressor failure is definite and certain. As we compute 
it, defendant paid in excess of $475.00 for show-up time 
and for lost time including time spent by defendant's em-
ployees in getting the compressor started. 
In addition to the lost time paid for by defendant, its 
equipment remained idle in the quarry for substantial 
periods because there was no compressed air available to 
operate it. We concede that the amount of defendant's 
damage in this connection is not definitely established, but 
it was more than nominal. 
Finally, the compressor which was furnished to oper-
ate defendant's leyner and the small Leroi compressor 
furnished to operate defendant's drills for secondary rock 
breaking were in poor mechanical condition and did not 
furnish sufficient compressed air to operate defendant's 
equipment efficiently. The evidence of the amount of dam-
age on account of the poor mechanical condition of the 
compressors is uncertain, but there can be no doubt but 
that it was substantial. Again, the uncertainty lies solely 
in the amount of damage and not in the fact of damage. 
The covenant of Sprague with respect to the removal 
by him from the quarry of the rock broken by defendant 
into contract size may be inartfully worded but it is not 
difficult to determine its meaning. Paragraph 10 provides 
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in the first sentence that defendant is to commence the 
performance of the subcontract as fixed in the prime con-
tract, and to complete the same in sufficient time to give 
Sprague the necessary time to deliver and place the mater-
ials on the levee within the time limit of the prime contract. 
Then follows the further provision "all secondary breaking 
of rock shall coincide with hauling operations so as not to 
cause delay." While this language may suggest the age-old 
question, which comes first the chicken or the egg?, there 
can be little doubt but that the operations of Sprague and 
the operations of the defendant were to be as nearly con-
current as practicable. Sprague could not haul the rock 
away until it had been broken into contract size. But neither 
could the defendant break the rock into contract size unless 
it was removed from the quarry almost as fast as it was 
broken. This is so because of the limited size of the quarry 
floor. 
If there were any ambiguity with respect to when 
Sprague was to remove the contract size rock from the 
quarry, the law would imply a covenant on his part to move 
the rock as fast as necessary to eliminate any obstruction 
to or interference with defendant's operations. 
The foregoing proposition is of universal application 
and is thus announced by the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton in Haley v. Brady, 17 Wash. 2d 775, 137 P. 2d 505, 146 
A. L. R. 859, as follows: 
"The following quotation from the case of M. L. 
Ryder Building Co. v. City of Albany, 187 App. Div. 
868, 176 N. Y. S. 456, 457, 458, is applicable to the 
instant case : 
" 'In every express contract for the erection of 
a building or for the performance of other construe-
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tive work, there is an implied term that the owner, 
or other person for whom the work is contracted to 
be done, will not obstruct, hinder, or delay the con-
tractor, but, on the contrary, will in all ways facili-
tate the performance of the work to be done by him. 
This is the principle which underlies the cases of 
flrfessenger v. City of Buffalo, 21 N. Y. 196; Mans-
field v. New York Cent. [&H.] R. R. Co., 102 N.Y. 
205, 6 N. E. 386; Mulholland v. Mayor, 113 N. Y. 
631, 20 N. E. 856; Horgan v. Mayor, 160 N. Y. 516, 
55 N. E. 204; Gearty v. Mayor, 171 N. Y. 61, 63 
N. E. 804; Del Genovese v. Third Ave. R. Co., 13 
App. Div. 412, 43 N. Y. S. 8. 
" 'In the Mansfield case the court said that the 
contract implied-"an understanding by all parties 
that they were to be unrestricted in the employment 
of means to perform it, and that nothing which it 
was the duty of the owner to do to enable the con-
tractor to perform, should be left undone."'" 
That Sprague violated both his express and implied 
covenant to remove the rock from the quarry as fast as it 
was broken into contract size, so as not to obstruct or inter-
fere with defendant's work is uncontradicted. Between the 
3rd day of February when the large explosion occurred, 
and about the 23rd of February the defendant broke into 
contract size all of the rock in the quarry that was visible 
or exposed. Not a single piece of this contract size rock 
was removed from the quarry until May. A few tons were 
moved on May 7 and a few more between the 15th and 
17th of May. A large amount of the contract size rock re-
mained in the quarry until August. There is no indefinite-
ness or uncertainty as to when the contract size rock was 
removed from the quarry because a record in triplicate was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
made at the time each truck load was hauled away. That 
the faliure to remove the rock totally prevented the defen-
dant from proceeding to break additional rock is clearly 
· established. In the latter part of April, Sprague notified 
the defendant that he intended to remove the contract size 
rock from the quarry. Immediately the defendant sent its 
employee Lowery to the quarry with equipment to proceed 
to break more rock. Sprague, however, failed to move any 
of the rock and plaintiff's employee and its equipment re-
mained idle in the quarry for a week. He was unable to 
break any rock because Sprague did not move any. 
The authorities cited above fully sustain the proposi-
tion that defendant was legally justified in ceasing opera-
tions in the quarry on May 1, because of the breach of the 
contract by Sprague. They also demonstrate that defendant 
is entitled to recover damages sustained by it. This damage 
may not be great but it is substantial, and the trial court 
erred in not allowing the defendant to recover. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT 
BREAK THE ROCK INTO CONTRACT SIZE 
IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER. 
The contract provides that defendant "shall proceed 
with such work in a workmanlike manner and complete the 
same without unreasonable delay." The court found that 
"defendant did not break the rock to the. size required in 
a workmanlike manner." While this is a pure conclusion 
of law and leaves the judgment without any support so far 
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:,I (To be inserted next preceding Point II, page 26} 
Regardless of the correctness or the fore. 
going conclusions, defendant is entitled to re-
cover upon its counterclaim the balance due and 
owing to it on account of the rock broken into 
contract size and on account of the 1,000 tons 
of rock broken b7 defendant and sold by Sprague. 
~ The trial court round that defendant broke 
t~: into contract size 9. 799 tons of rock (for con-
venienee 9,800 tons} {R. 27). Sprague admitted 
that he sold to Doyle Methevs 1,000 tons of the 
rock broken by defendant. The contract price or 
3 the·broken rock was forty-eight eents per ton 
. (Ex. A). The total of these items is ,5,184.00. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company paid 
~~ defendant $4,392.00. Sprague paid nothing. The 
~ balance du& defendant is $792.00. 
Plaintiffs in thei~ complaint concede that 
defend,:nt is entitled to be paid this balance. 
They clafm that defendant was given credit for 
it. We have already demonstrated that neither of 
the plaintiffs had any valid claim against de-
fendant. There was, therefore, nothing against 
which plaintiffs could credit the balance due 
the defendant. It remains owing to the defendant. 
At a later place in this brief, we will point 
out that United States Fidelit,y & Guaranty Compan7 
became primarily liable to the detendant for the 
performance of Sprague's covenants in the subcon-
tract. 
I~ We submit that the court erred in not award-ing the detendant a judgment against plaintiffs tor the balance admittedly due tor the rock broken by it. 
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as it awards plaintiff's "loading and hauling costs" we 
will treat it as a finding of fact. 
At the outset we emphasize that the plaintiffs did not 
in either of the complaints filed by them make any sugges-
tion of complaint with respect to the manner in which 
defendant broke the rock. Neither did they assert that any 
of the equipment used by the defendant was insufficient 
or unsuitable for the work. There was no allegation that 
the defendant's employees were unskilled or that they were 
negligent in performing the work. 
The rock to be broken was then in its native state in 
the quarry, which was a narrow canyon with a wall of 
solid lava rock. The parties contemplated that two break-
ing operations would be necessary to reduce the rock to 
contract size, because the contract provides that all secon-
dary breaking of rock shall coincide with hauling opera-
tions so as not to cause delay, and that if the breaking of 
the rock into contract size resulted in the production of 
rock of any size which is usable or salable, the same was to 
be paid for by Sprague at the rate of forty-eight cents per 
ton. 
Defendant proceeded to break the rock by the use of 
explosives. The primary breaking was done by drilling 
powder holes into the quarry wall. The first hole was drilled 
into the side of the wall a distance of seventy feet with two 
wings each thirty feet long. At the end of each wing, a 
pocket was created and the powder deposited in the pocket 
(R. 288). Sprague·'s superintendent visited the quarry 
while these powder holes were being drilled, as did also 
some Government engineers in charge of the prime project 
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(R. 113-114). No one offered any criticism of defendant's 
work. The first blast broke several thousand tons of the 
rock. This left only a comparatively small part of the total 
to be broken. The primary breaking of this part was done 
by drilling the powder holes on the top of the quarry wall 
(R. 367-8). After defendant quit the quarry in October, 
plaintiffs adopted the same method of doing the primary 
breaking that had been employed by the defendant (R. 119). 
The secondary breaking of the rock was done by drill-
ing powder holes into the larger pieces and by plastering 
the explosive to the side of the smaller pieces. Plaintiffs 
also adopted this method of secondary breaking after de-
fendant left the quarry in October (R. 115). 
The provision of the contract requiring the defendant 
to proceed with the work in a workmanlike manner and 
complete the same without unreasonable delay adds nothing 
to defendant's duties or obligations. If the contract were 
silent on the subject, the law would imply a covenant on 
the part of defendant to proceed in a workmanlike manner 
and complete the work without unreasonable delay. See 
Westbrook v. Watts, 268 S. W. 2d 694, (Tex. Civ. App. 
1954). 
When the defendant undertook to do the work in a 
workmanlike manner, it undertook to do it as a reasonably 
skillful person would. It did not undertake to employ the 
highest skill known in the mining industry, nor would it 
discharge its duty by employing the least skill known to that 
industry. A workmanlike manner of breaking rock is the 
method that would be employed by a reasonably skillful 
miner. See Holland v. Rhoades, 56 Ore. 206, 106 Pac. 779; 
Westbrook v. Watts, supra; Economy, etc. v. Raymond, etc., 
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111 F. 2d 875, (C. C. A. 7th) ; Cameron v. Sisson, 24 Ariz. 
226, 246 P. 2d 189. 
It seems to us that the obvious method of breaking a 
mountain of solid lava rock into sizes of 50 to 350 pounds 
is by the use of explosives. No witness in this case sug-
gested any other method, and the plaintiffs themselves 
adopted it after the defendant quit because of lack of com-
pressed air. 
There is no evidence that the holes made in the moun-
tain to receive the explosives were unsuitable for that pur-
pose or were improperly located. Making the powder holes 
on the top of the wall may not have been as efficient as 
putting them in the side, but at that time most of the rock 
had been broken by the initial explosion, and the condition 
of the quarry had been radically changed. In any event, 
plaintiffs themselves used this method of primary breaking 
when they took over the operation after October 5. 
No complaint is made that the equipment employed 
by defendant to break the rock was either unsuitable or 
inefficient. The operators of the equipment were exper-
ienced and competent workmen. The explosives were used 
with skill. One explosion broke several thousand tons of 
the rock. 
We submit that the finding under consideration is 
without support either in the pleadings or the evidence and 
cannot form the basis of any judgment against the defen-
dant. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
PROVE THAT THE COST TO PLAINTIFF OF 
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PRODUCING THE ADDITIONAL ROCK EX-
CEEDED WHAT HE AGREED TO PAY DE-
FENDANT. 
Assuming, contrary to the undisputed facts, that de-
fendant was not justified in failing to produce the full 
amount of contract size rock required, there is no factual 
basis for awarding plaintiffs any damages on account of 
such failure. 
The trial court found that the defendant broke into 
contract size 9,799 tons of rock, and that the amount re-
quired under the contract of January 25, was 15,400 tons. 
For present purposes we accept these findings. In this 
connection, however, we point out that Sprague admits that 
he sold 1,000 tons of rock that had been broken by defen-
dant (R. 251). This sale was made without the knowledge 
or consent of the defendant (R. 251), and since the rock 
was not used upon the levee, defendant must under any 
circumstances have this amount of rock deducted from 
the amount which it was required under the contract to 
break. 
This 4,600 tons of rock was broken by Sprague, that is 
he hired the necessary employees and equipment to do the 
work. He did not purchase the additional rock and did not 
subcontract the breaking, or call for bids. In this circum-
stance and upon the assumption above stated, the measure 
of Sprague's damage for the failure of the defendant to 
break into contract size the additional 4,600 tons of rock 
would be the difference between what Sprague agreed to 
pay the defendant and the reasonable cost to him of break-
ing the rock. In determining this difference, Sprague is 
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not entitled to any costs of the compressed air used to break 
the rock, because under the contract he agreed to furnish 
the compressed air. 
This rule of damages is elementary. See Dover Lumber 
Company v. Case, 31 Idaho 296, 170 Pac. 108; Northern 
Construction Company v. Johnson, 132 Ark. 528, 201 S. W. 
510; Richmond, etc. v. Black, 39 Cal. App. 1, 177 Pac. 508; 
Trinity, etc. v. Mills, 293 Ky. 463, 169 S. W. 2d 311; Schaff-
ner v. President, etc., 94 Ind. App. 554, 154 N. E. 780. 
There is no finding of fact by which it is determined 
what this difference amounts to. The finding "that by 
reason of said breaches of said contract on the part of de-
fendant, the plaintiff Sprague suffered damages in the 
sum of $6,368.85, which sum was necessarily expended by 
plaintiff Sprague in performing those things required by 
the contract between plaintiff and defendant to be per-
formed by defendant over and above all credits given by 
plaintiff to defendant" falls short of such a determination. 
It is a pure conclusion of law. It is similar to the find-
ing made in Duggins v. Colby, 45 Utah 335, 145 Pac. 
1042. In that case defendant sold to the plaintiff some 
sheep in exchange for a tract of land, and agreed to have 
the sheep registered before a certain date. Before that date, 
plaintiff sold the sheep to third parties with an agreement 
to have them registered. Some of the sheep were not reg-
istered by defendant, and plaintiff compromised the claims 
of the parties to whom he. sold the sheep. The court found 
only that registering sheep adds to their market value and 
that by the failure of defendant to have the sheep registered, 
plaintiff's damage was a sum equal to the amount for which 
he compromised with his buyers. There was no finding as 
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to the number of sheep not registered or of the market value 
of unregistered sheep of the kind sold. This court held that 
the finding made was a mere conclusion and since the true 
measure of plaintiff's damage was the difference between 
the agreed value of the land given in exchange for the sheep 
and the reasonable market value of the sheep unregistered, 
there was no determination of this issue and nothing to 
support a judgment for plaintiff. 
Not only is there not a finding that it cost Sprague 
more to break the additional rock than he agreed to pay de-
fendant, but the memorandum opinion of the court declares 
that such cost was less than what he agreed to pay the de-
fendant. We quote from the memorandum opinion the fol-
lowing: 
"The evidence reveals the breaking of rock by 
Sprague after Boyles quit cost 45.5 cents per ton 
for the 5,485 tons broken by him, or $4,495.55, which 
shows a cost incurred by Sprague which had it been 
done under the contract with Boyles would be 
$4,632.80, a saving to Sprague of $137.00." 
While the court was in error in stating that the contract 
required defendant to break 5,485 tons in addition to that 
broken by it, there is, nevertheless, a clear-cut decision that 
the cost to Sprague of breaking the additional rock was 
45.5 cents per ton, which is 2.50 cents less than Sprague 
agreed to pay. In this state of the record the award made 
against the defendant for the sum of $6,668.85 is not only 
unsupported by any finding of fact, but is contrary to the 
decision made by the trial court. 
Quite apart from the foregoing considerations, the evi-
dence in the record is insufficient to prove that the cost to 
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Sprague of breaking the additional rock was more than he 
agreed to pay the defendant. The evidence produced by 
the plaintiff with respect to the cost of breaking the addi-
tional rock consists of several packages or bundles of mis-
cellaneous invoices, bills and statements purporting to have 
been made by various parties covering material of various 
kinds, rental of equipment and machinery, claims for work 
and labor and for transportation, taxes and other charges. 
Mrs. Sprague described the contents of these various pack-
ages and bundles as bills rendered "for the production of 
rock" (R. 136-157). The defendant objected to the introduc-
tion in evidence of these packages and bundles (R. 141-148). 
In addition to these packages and bundles of miscel-
laneous documents, plaintiff introduced in evidence a num-
ber of checks issued to various parties and purporting to 
bear the endorsement of the payees. No proof of such 
endorsements was offered. The checks were identified 
simply as having been issued to pay bills for labor and 
material used "in the production of rock." 
The objection of the defendant to the packages and to 
the checks was clearly well taken. See Zemp etc. v. Harmon 
etc., (S. C. 1954), 82 S. E. 2d 531. 
Even if they were admissible in evidence it is impos-
sible to find in this heterogenous mass of documents any 
segregation of the items relating to the cost of breaking the 
rock. Assuming that the documents in the packages are 
invoices for labor and material furnished to Sprague, that 
the invoices were paid, and that the labor and material 
went into the project, there is still no way of determining 
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what items are to be allocated to the work which defendant 
agreed to do. There is no segregation of the cost of the 
compressed air required to break the additional rock, or of 
the cost of the drills required in breaking the rock, or of 
the cost of the labor required to operate the drills, or of 
the cost of hauling the rock from the quarry to the levee. 
There is no breakdown whatever that would enable the 
court to say that it cost Sprague anything more to perform 
the labor which defendant undertook to perform than he 
agreed to pay defendant. 
This is not a case in which damages could be presumed 
to arise out of the failure of defendant to produce the 
specified quantity of rock. The burden rested upon the 
plaintiffs to prove that it cost them more to break the addi-
tional rock than Sprague was required to pay under his 
contract with defendant. They did not meet that burden. 
See Stevens v. Mitchell, 51 N. M. 411, 186 P. 2d 386. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 
PLAINTIFFS ANY AMOUNT ON ACCOUNT 
OF LOADING OR HAULING COSTS. 
The court in its Finding of Fact No. 5 concluded "that 
by reason of said breach of said contract on the part of the 
defendant, the plaintiff Sprague also suffered damages in 
the sum of $823.15 for increased costs of loading and haul-
ing rock." There are no facts found which afford any basis 
for this conclusion. Neither is there any evidence in the 
record to support it. 
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All defendant agreed to do was to break a specified 
:. amount of rock into certain .sizes within a limited time, and 
in a workmanlike manner. We have demonstrated that de·-
fendant . was excused from breaking the full amount of 
rock because of the failure of plaintiffs to furnish com-
pressed air, and that Sprague's failure to complete his 
prime contract in time was due to a combination of cir-
cumstances for which the defendant was not responsible. We 
have also shown that the work done by the defendant in 
breaking more than 9,000 tons of rock was done in a work-
manlike manner. 
Even if it be assumed that the foregoing conclusions 
are incorrect, there is no basis for awarding the plaintiffs 
anything for so-called increased costs of loading and haul-
ing rock. All that appears in the record as to the matter of 
loading and hauling costs is that to begin with Sprague 
paid his truckers 70 cents per ton for hauling the rock, and 
later increased the rate to 80 cents (R. 267). This appears 
to have been solely a matter of agreement between the 
parties, and nothing that the defendant did or failed to do 
had any connection with the increase of the hauling rates. 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision said that 
the increased hauling charges were the result of a "strike" 
on the part of the truckers because the rock was not pro-
duced as fast as they could haul it. This assertion in the 
Memorandum Decision is unfounded. There is not a word 
of evidence of any "strike" or protest of any kind on 
the part of any of the truckers who hauled the rock from 
the quarry. All that appears in the record is some hearsay 
testimony objected to by the defendant and erroneously 
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received by the trial court to the effect that some truckers 
wanted more money for hauling rock and complained that 
they couldn't get loaded fast enough and couldn't make any 
money (R. 267). There is likewise not any evidence· that 
the methods of operations of the defendant in the quarry 
varied in the slightest degree at anytime. The rock· was 
produced in exactly the same manner both before and··after 
the increase in the hauling rates. 
We respectfully submit that the award to the plain-
tiffs for increased costs of loading and hauling r6ck is 
wholly unwarranted by either the pleadings or the evidence. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAIN-
TIFFS $850.00 ON ACCOUNT OF·SPRAGUE'S" 
FAILURE TO COMPLETE HIS PRIME CON-
TRACT. 
It is conceded that Sprague did not complete his prime 
contract within the time therein provided and was penal::· 
ized for his delay. The defendant is in no manner responsi-
. I 
ble for any delay on the part of Sprague in the performance: 
of the prime contract. The delay was due to his own fai~- ' 
ure to furnish the defendant with compressed air and -tor 
remove the contract-size rock from the quarry within a 
reasonable time after it was broken. His financial collapse, 
weather conditions, restrictions upon the use of highways 
for hauling rock, modification of the prime contract and 
changes in the plans of the levee undoubtedly caused con-
siderable delay for which defendant is in no manner respon-
sible. 
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Sprague's defaults have been dealt with above and will 
not be reiterated, other than to emphasize that the coyote 
holes would have been completed in a fraction of the time 
actually employed if the defendant had been supplied with 
compressed air sufficient to operate its drills efficiently, 
and that several thousand tons of rock broken into contract 
size remained in the quarry from the latter part of Febru .. 
ary until after the middle of May and a lesser amount until 
August, where it completely prevented the defendant from 
proceeding to break the additional rock required to fulfill 
its contract. 
In addition, Sprague's failure to make the payment 
due in April justified defendant in abandoning the contract 
on May 1. The payment was due April 20, and it amounted 
to $4,392.00. 
This court has held in line with authorities elsewhere 
that failure to pay for labor and material at the time agreed 
upon relieves the contractor of his obligation to proceed 
with the work. 
In Bennett v. Shaughnessy, et al., 6 Utah 273, 22 Pac. 
156, plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby 
the plaintiff undertook to drive a tunnel along a vein of ore 
in the defendant's mine for a distance of 1,200 feet, and to 
complete the work on a specified date. The defendant agreed 
to pay for the work as it progressed to each 100 feet. 
Plaintiff constructed the tunnel a distance of 100 feet, and 
was paid according to the contract. He continued the work 
until the tunnel had been completed to a length of more 
than 200 feet. Defendant failed to pay for the second 100 
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feet when it became due, and the plaintiff abandoned the 
work. He brought suit to recover for the work done and to 
have the judgment made a lien upon the property. The 
Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah held that plaintiff 
was justified in abandoning the tunnel work and was en-
titled to recover for the full footage performed also a lien 
upon the defendant's property. The court said: 
"* * * The character of the work to be 
performed under the contract in this case, the 
length of time given, and the amount of money re-
quired for its completion, as well as the language 
of the contract itself, show that the object of the 
provision for payments at stated periods during the 
prosecution of the work was to enable plaintiff with 
the money thus obtained to continue the work until 
completed. The payment of the $1,000.00 upon the 
completion and acceptance of each 100 feet was a 
condition precedent to ·the further prosecution of 
the work by the plaintiff, and the failure ·of the 
defendants to pay the $1,000.00 due on the comple-
tion of the second 100 feet justified plaintiff in 
abandoning the contract, and, the defendants being 
in fault, the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the 
work done. The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed." 
Another reason why Sprague cannot recover any dam-
age for the alleged delay of the defendant is that the con-
tract sued upon authorized Sprague to "put on such addi-
tional force and outfit as may be required" if the defendant 
should be unable to furnish adequate labor, equipment or 
material to complete the contract within the time specified. 
The parties to a contract are, of course, at liberty to pro-
vide for an exclusive remedy for delay in performance of 
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the work agreed upon. We submit that the parties to the 
contract under consideration did just that. 
In Russell v. Bothwell, et al., 57 Utah 362, 194 Pac. 
1109, the contract covering the construction of a dwelling 
provided that if the contractor should be delayed in the 
completion or prosecution of the work by the negligence or 
default of the owner, then the time for completion of the 
work might be extended for a period equivalent to the time 
lost by reason of such negligence or default. The contractor 
was delayed by the failure of the owner to furnish material 
promptly, and this court held that no damages could be 
recovered. 
POINT VI 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARAN-
TY COMPANY IS LIABLE TO DEFENDANT 
FOR FAILURE TO FURNISH COMPRESSED 
AIR BECAUSE IT ASSUMED THE OBLIGA-
TIONS OF SPRAGUE UNDER THE SUBCON-
TRACT. 
Defendant does not assert any claim against the United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company for failure of Sprague 
to furnish compressed air prior to the time it induced the 
defendant to resume operations in the quarry. Defendant 
does, however, maintain United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company is liable for failure to furnish compressed air 
after September 21. This liability is founded upon its 
agreement to do so in consideration of the defendant resum-
ing performance of the subcontract. 
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As already stated, the defendant was prevented from 
performing its undertaking to break the specified amount 
of rock by the failure of Sprague to remove the contract 
size rock from the quarry. Defendant was unable to do 
anything in the quarry from the latter part of February 
until early in August, because the contract-size rock re--
mained in the quarry during that period. It is true that 
defendant sent its employee back to the quarry the latter 
part of April when Sprague informed it that he intended 
to move the rock to the levee, and that this employee drilled 
a few holes into some oversize rock preparatory to blasting. 
However, Sprague did not move any rock, and defendant's 
employee was withdrawn from the quarry on May 1. Even 
if defendant had not been prevented from performing its 
obligation by the failure of Sprague to move the rock, it 
was fully justified in terminating the subcontract on May 
1, by his failure to make the progress payment which was 
due on April 20. 
In this status of the subcontract, the United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company appears on the scene. 
Sprague was financially unable to pay the progress payment 
or the bills he had incurred for labor and materials furn-
ished to him and used in the performance of his prime 
contract. The Guaranty Company was his surety not only 
on his performance bond but also on his payment bond. 
The progress payment plus the bills owing by Sprague 
exceeded $30,000.00. These bills and the progress payment 
were paid by the surety. 
In the latter part of July, it sent its representative Mr. 
Douglas to the project with instructions to do everything 
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possible to assist Sprague in the performance of his obli-
gations. Mr. Douglas testified: 
"Q. Did you make any arrangements with Mr. 
Sprague or anyone connected with Boyles Bros. with 
respect to this work? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. This quarry work? 
"A. I talked to Mr. Stevens relative to his 
contract with Sprague and he outlined to me what 
his responsibilities were and what he intended to do, 
and I as representative of United States Fidelity 
and Guaranty Company come down to assist Sprague 
in connection conjunction with working with him 
to try and do that. 
"Q. Didn't you tell or assure Mr. Stevens that 
Boyles Bros. Drilling Company would be paid for 
work? 
"A. Well, as a surety to the contractor I did 
assure him but it wouldn't be necessary by the fact 
we were bonding the contract, and assured him he 
Would be paid for work he did." 
On August 11, Mr. Douglas on behalf of United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company wrote defendant among other 
things "we stand ready to fulfill our part in this matter 
and we must insist and we feel our demand is only reason-
able that you fulfill your part of the agreement" (Ex. 27-P). 
A short time later Mr. Douglas again writes to the 
defendant to express "our appreciation of the manner in 
which you have tackled the quarry job and the results that 
are being obtained" (Ex. 28-D). Shortly thereafter, a 315 
compressor was sent to the quarry and within a few weeks 
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several thousand tons of rock were broken into contract 
size by defendant. i 
We think there is. implicit in this evidence on agree- )il 
menton the part of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com- :i:! 
pany to perform all of the obligations of Sprague under the 
subcontract in consideration of the defendant resuming op-
erations thereunder, and that this agreement made the 
surety company primarily liable to furnish the defendant 
sufficient compressed air to operate its drills. In support 
of this point see Everts v. Matteson, 21 Cal. 2d 437, 132 P. 
2d 476; 4 Williston on Contracts, (Rev. Ed. 1936), Sec. 
1211. 
If there were any doubt about the primary liability of 
the Guaranty Company, it is dispelled by the positive alle-
gation in the original complaint to the effect that it became 
obligated to perform the contract and did perform it (R. 
43-4). 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAIN-
TIFFS $292.80 FOR ROCK PURCHASED. 
The court concluded in its findings of fact "that by 
reason of the breach of contract on the part of defendant 
the plaintiff suffered damages in the sum of $292.80 for 
rock he purchased to complete his contract with the United 
States." 
There are several reasons why this award is erroneous, 
even if it be~ that defendant is not excused from its 
failure to produce the full amount of rock provided for in 
the contract. 
In the first place, the so-called finding is a conclusion 
of law, and was without any basis in fact. Secondly, there 
~I 
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is no evidence that Sprague purchased any rock to take the 
place of rock which defendant did not produce. When 
plaintiff offered eyidence of the purchase of rock, the court 
sustained the defendant's objection to the offer (R. 81). 
Finally, it is undenied that Sprague, pursuant to the 
provisions of the contract, proceeded to break the additional 
rock after defendant left the quarry on October 5. The full 
measure of plaintiff's damage for defendant's failure to 
produce all rock required by the contract, assuming the 
failure is not excused by the plaintiff's breach of the con-
tract, is the cost of breaking the rock exclusive of the cost 
of compressed air. If Sprague purchased additional rock 
and if that rock was of the kind which defendant was re-
quired to produce, he made that purchase on his own ac-
count and upon no assumption is defendant liable therefor. 
In this connection it should be pointed out that 
Sprague's prime contract was modified, subsequent to mak-
ing the subcontract with defendant, and that it required 
1100 tons of rock to meet the requirements of the modifi-
cation (R. 79). If Sprague did purchase rock (and there 
is no evidence that he did), he undoubtedly used it to meet 
the modification of the prime contract. 
POINT VIII 
THE JUDGMENT IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE 
IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT. 
The complaint alleges that the defendant only partially 
performed its agreement to break the specified amount of 
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rock and that as a result of such failure Sprague paid cer-
tain sums for labor and material required to break the ad-
ditional rock. The defendant in its answer and counter-
claim admitted that it produced only part of the rock re-
quired by the contract, but was prevented from fully per-
forming its obligation by the failure of Sprague to furnish 
sufficient compressed air to operate its drills efficiently, 
and to remove the rock from the quarry as it was broken 
in contract size. 
The controlling issue so far as the plaintiff's case is 
concerned is: Did Sprague supply the defendant with suf-
ficient compressed air to operate its drills efficiently? 
The findings of fact made by the trial court are com-
pletely silent upon this issue. Not a word is said anywhere 
upon the subject of compressed air. The trial court adopted 
the findings proposed by the plaintiff who studiously 
avoided entirely the matter of compressed air. 
The so-called finding that Sprague performed his part 
of the subcontract is a pure conclusion of law. Whether he 
did perform his contract was the turning point of the 
lawsuit. Without an affirmative finding that Sprague 
furnished the defendant throughout its operations in the 
quarry sufficient compressed air to operate efficiently the 
drills required to break the rock, there is no foundation 
whatever for any judgment· in plaintiff's favor. With re-
spect to Sprague's surety, its right to recover could rise 
no higher than those of its insured. That the judgment is 
not supported by findings of fact and must be vacated is 
not a debatable proposition. The only question is whether 
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this court should direct the trial court to dismiss the com-
plaint or to grant a new trial. Inasmuch as there is no 
conflict in the evidence with respect to Sprague's failure to 
furnish compressed air as he agreed to do, there is no 
alternative open to this court except to direct that the 
complaint be dismissed. 
POINT IX 
THE JUDGMENT MUST BE VACATED BE-
CAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE COURT 
TO FIND ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES 
RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS. 
If we indulge the violent assumption that there was 
some conflict in the evidence with respect to the nonper-
formance by the parties of their respective covenants in 
the contract, the judgment would have to be vacated, be-
cause of the failure of the trial court to make findings 
upon any of such issues. The first count in the complaint 
alleged in substance that the defendant only partially per-
formed its duties under the contract, that Sprague paid 
out certain sums for labor and material to complete the 
duties of defendant, and that Sprague "suffered damages by 
reason of defendant's failure to fully perform" the contract 
a certain sum "for additional loading and hauling costs." 
It was further alleged that by reason of defendant's failure 
to perform, Sprague was unable to perform his prime con-
tract, and suffered liquidated damages in a certain amount. 
The second count is practically identical to the first 
count, except that United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
46 
pany is alleged to have paid out the sums and suffered the 
damages that Sprague claims in the first count to have paid 
out and suffered. 
The defendant in its answer and counterclaim admits 
that it did not produce the full amount of rock specified in 
the contract, and alleges as legal justification for such fail-
ure the breach by Sprague of his covenant to furnish com-
pressed air, his failure to remove the rock from the quarry 
as it was broken by defendant, and his failure to pay the 
seventy-five percent of the contract price on April 20. De-
fendant also asserted that Sprague sold a large amount of 
the rock broken by defendant, for which he did not account 
to the defendant. 
The counterclaim also alleged that because of the 
breaches of the subcontract by Sprague, defendant after 
producing a large quantity of rock to the contract size, 
ceased work and removed its men and equipment from the 
quarry, that about that time the United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Company informed the defendant that Sprague 
was insolvent and financially unable to proceed with his 
contract, that if defendant would resume breaking rock 
it would furnish the necessary compressed air, and would 
pay for all of the rock; that in reliance upon these prom-
ises, defendant resumed the work of producing the rock as 
required by the subcontract with Sprague, that United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company failed to perform its 
promises except to make the progress payment, and as a 
result of such failure, defendant again ceased work and 
removed its men and equipment from the quarry before 
the contract amount of rock was produced. 
An 
::ta 
·~:n 
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The reply put in issue the affirmative allegations of 
defendant's counterclaim, except plaintiffs admitted that 
they sold some rock that was broken by the defendant. They 
asserted "that defendant was given credit for the amount 
of said rock." 
An examination of the findings made and entered by 
the trial court reveals no determination whatever of any 
of the issues raised by the above mentioned pleadings of 
the parties, nor was there a finding of fact which necessar-
ily or even by implication resolves any such issue. 
Upon the assumption above made, the judgment must 
be vacated for it is settled by a long line of decisions of 
this court that it is reversible error for the trial court to 
fail to find upon any material issue. See Gaddis Invest-
ment Company v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P. 2d 284, 
and cases there cited. 
POINT X 
THE PRESENT ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ABATED BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF 
ANOTHER SUIT. 
The record disclosed that on September 22, 1952, the 
plaintiffs commenced an action in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County to recover damages from the defendant on 
account of an alleged breach of the contract now under 
consideration (R. 43-4). The complaint is in substance the 
same as the complaint in Case No. 99370, the only difference 
being that it was alleged that the plaintiff, United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company, issued its bond for the per-
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formance of the contract of defendant with plaintiff, W. W. 
Sprague, and that by reason of the alleged breach of con-
tract on the part of defendant, United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Company became obligated to perform said con-
tract, and did perform said contract to its damage in the 
sum of $5,585.22. 
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff asked leave to file an 
amended complaint (R. 49). The proposed amended com-
plaint begins with the recitation that no attempt is made 
to plead a cause of action on behalf of United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty Company. It omits the allegations with 
respect to the guaranty of the contract between Sprague 
and defendant. Otherwise, the cause of action in the pro-
posed amended complaint is the same as the original com-
plaint. The trial court refused to permit the filing of the 
amended complaint (R. 57). 
In its answer and counterclaim the defendant set up 
pendency of this prior action. 
We submit that the present action should have been 
dismissed because the order ref~ng to allow the plaintiff 
to file an amended complaint isJt>ar to the maintenance of 
the present action. To this effect are: State v. California 
Packing, etc., 105 Utah 191, 145 P. 2d 784. 
SUMMARY 
The uncontradicted evidence in this case discloses that 
Sprague breached his contract in three distinct particulars. 
One, he failed to furnish the defendant with sufficient com-
pressed air to efficiently operate its drills required to break 
::.ra~t 
.: ~[1 
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the rock into contract size. Two, he failed and neglected to 
remove from the quarry the rock broken into contract size, 
thereby preventing the defendant from performing its 
undertaking to break a specified amount of rock. Three, 
he failed to pay the defendant seventy-five percent of the 
contract price on April 20, or at all. 
The foregoing breaches of the contract by Sprague 
justified the defendant in abandoning the contract on May 
1, and again on October 5. Sprague having breached his 
contract cannot recover any damages from the defendant, 
but on the contrary is liable to the defendant for the dam-
age sustained by it as a result of those breaches. Sprague's 
surety has no greater rights under the contract sued upon 
than Sprague has, and it became primarily liable to the 
defendant for the damage sustained by it as the result of 
its failure to furnish defendant with sufficient compressed 
air to operate its drills following the breakdown of the 315 
compressor on September 21. 
Even if it be assumed that the defendant was not leg-
ally warranted in terminating the contract on October 5, 
the plaintiffs can recover nothing because they undertook 
to produce the additional rock as they had the right to do 
under the subcontract, and there is no evidence in the record 
which proves or tends to prove that it cost them more to 
break the rock than Sprague agreed to pay the defendant. 
There is no claim made in the pleadings and there is 
no evidence that the rock broken by defendant under the 
contract was broken in an unworkmanlike manner. There 
is no evidence that anything done by the defendant or 
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omitted by it caused the increased "loading and hauling 
costs" incurred by Sprague. 
There is no evidence that Sprague's default under his 
prime contract was due to anything other than his own 
failure to perform his subcontract with defendant and his 
own modification of the prime contract and his own finan-
cial failure and weather conditions. 
The findings of fact made by the trial court are insuf-
ficient to support the judgment appealed from, and the 
material issues raised by the pleadings were not determined. 
Finally, the action should have been abated because 
another action between the same parties involving precisely 
the same issues was pending and undetermined in the same 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR., 
for VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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